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to ensure that any power vacuum which ensued would be adequately filled by the United States (in accordance with her own national interests) and if we were to retain even a small military presence we should be under continuing pressure to play a greater military part than our rescurces or our interests made desirable. The strategic
purpose of maintaining a maritime and air presence in Australia was far from clear and the maintenance of such a presence would in time of
emergency entail pressure upon us to re-enforce it, at much heavier
cost, if we were to avoid the prospect of defeat. We should therefore make clear to our allies that we aimed wholly to withdraw by a given date and that in the intervening period our resources would only permit us to spend a given amount on the defence of our interests in
the area, whether by maintaining forces or in providing aid. In that
period we should offer to divide that total sum between the provision
of forces and the provision of aid in accordance with the needs of our
allies, as long as our total expenditure did not exceed the amount which
we had declared ourselves able to provide.
It was however the general view that while in accordance with the
Cabinet's decision at its previous meeting no commitment could be made in
the forthcoming discussions in Washingtom, on whether or not we would
maintain maritime and air forces using facilities in Australia after our withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore, it was likely to prove in
accordance with our best interests to offer to maintain such forces.
If we were to withdraw altogether from the Far East there could be no
certainty that the United States would take over our responsibilities:
indeed our withdrawal was likely to increase the pressure in Congress
on the United States Administration not to continue with commitments elsewhere
which other countries, and the United Kingdom in particular, were not prepared to support. The risk of the United States Government adopting an isolationist policy in later years would be gravely contrary to our
interests, which lay in maintaining stability in the Far East and in ensuring that the neighbours of the People's Republic of China were not
left wholly unsupported in the face of threats to their security from her
growing military power. Even if the United States were to decide in the
face of our withdrawal to maintain their military presence in the Far East
after the Vietnam war was over, our withdrawal from the area would not
only deprive us of the influence which we might otherwise expect to have
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